ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF ACCOUNTING PRODUCT COSTS IN OLIGOPOLISTIC PRICING DECISION by Na'im, Ainun





Makalah ini menganalisis masalah proses penentuan harga oleh manajer
dalam pasar oligopolistik. Literatur ekonomi memberikan pendekatan penentuan
harga berdasarkan analisis terhadap biaya marginal dan penghasilan marginal
(marginal cost and marginal revenue analysis), sementara bukti empirik
menunjukkan bahwa manajer cenderung menggunakan pendekatan akuntansi
(Govindarajan dan Anthony 1980), i.e., biaya variabel dan biaya penuh (variabel
dan full costing). Analisis terhadap informasi sebagai proksi untuk marginal cost
dalam proses heuristic penentuan harga.
Makalah ini mengembangkan analisis mengenai penggunaan informasi
biaya produksi akuntansi telah diteliti dalam struktur pasar monopoli (Lere 1983
dan 1986), dan struktur pasar oligopoli (Dorward 1986). Perbedaan makalah ini
dengan makalah Dorward adalah bahwa makalah ini menganalisis proses
penentuan harga dengan menggunakan Bertrand's model, sementara Dorward
menggunakan Cournout's model
Hasil analisis makalah ini menunjukkan bahwa Bertrand's model
memberikan hasil yang sama dengan Cournot's model, tetapi Bertrand's model
lebih menunjukkan kompleksitas proses penentuan harga dalam dalam pasar
oligopoli yang lebih tinggi dibanding dengan proses penentuan harga pada pasar
monopoli. Dalam pasar oligopoli manajer tidak cukup hanya memperhatikan
fungsi perntintaan dan biayanya sendiri tetapi harus juga memperhatikan fungsi
permintaan dan biaya kompetitor, dan aksi dan reaksi kompetitor.
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INTRODUCTION
In pricing decision, two types of cost information are available in the
literature: economics and accounting based cost information. Economics suggests
that managers should use marginal cost and marginal revenue information for
deciding optimal price and output level, while accounting literature provides full
(absorption) and variable (product) cost information. Which information is
actually used by managers is an empirical question.
Govindarajan and Anthony (1980), in a survey to the U.S. managers
found, consistent with that of Skinner (1970), that it was accounting information
that was used by the U.S. managers for pricing decision, not economics based
information. This is surprising because the economics approach for pricing
decision has been established and apparent in managerial economics and
microeconomics literature.
While Skinner's (1970) and Govindarajan and Anthony's (1980) studies
were exploratory, further empirical studies indicated relatively consistent results
on the internal validity of the theory.While Tichlias and Chalos1 (1988) study
using an experiment involving accounting students in the U.K. support the theory,
Hilton, Swierenga, and Turner (1988) using the same method in the U.S. found
partial supports for the theory11. The studies suggest that under uncertainty and
costly marginal cost information, managers use accounting product costs to
approach optimal price and output level. Further, Dickhout and Lere (1983), Lere
(1986), and Dorward (1986) showed theoretically that in certain settings and
heuristic process the accounting product costs can be used to approach the optimal
price and output level.
Except for Dorward's (1986) all of the studies explaining the use of
product costs for pricing decision reviewed above assumed a monopolistic market
structure. Dorward analytically explained the use of product costs under
oligopolistic market structure using Cournot's model of Nash equilibrium.
1 ln detail, the two studies are different in that the former study didn't consider uncertainties in
demand and cost functions and risk preference of the decision makers.
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This paper extends the theoretical analysis of the use of product cost in
two respects. First, similar to Dorward's, this study assumes an oligopolistic
market that involves competition among the firms. Second, this study uses Nash-
equilibrium using Bertrand's model instead of Cornout's model applied by
Dorward. The effects of using accounting product cost will be discussed based on
the refutable assumptions embedded in the analysis of the Nash equilibrium price.
The analysis of the use of accounting product costs by oligopolistic firms
under Bertrand's equilibrium reveal similar result with that of Cournot's
equilibrium.ln addition the analysis indicates that oligopolistic firm have reveals
more complex problem than that of monopolistic firms. While monopolistic firms
consider only their own cost functions and demand functions, the oligopolistic
firms should consider the actions and reactions of the competitors in addition to
the consumers' utility preference and the firms' cost functions.
The rests of the paper are organized as follow. The next section discusses
the theoretical analysis on the price and output level decision under monopoly.
Section three analyzes the price and output level decision under oligopoly and the
use of accounting product costs, and the last section provides the conclusion.
PRICE AND OUTPUT LEVEL DECISION UNDER MONOPOLY
Dickhout and Lere (1983), Lere (1986), and Tichlias (1988) found that the
extent to which the absorption cost and variable cost can be used to approach
optimal price and quantity decision depends upon the price elasticity of demand
function and the condition whether the cost function is increasing or decreasing.
Under incomplete production cost information, absorption (variable) product cost
is a better approximate to marginal cost when the average total costs are
increasing (decreasing), and the more elastic demand curve faced by the firm
enhances the deviation2. As illustrated in figure l, Optimal  price and quantity
2 Mathematically, these relationships can be explained by substituting the
marginal cost [g'(x)w2] by average total  cost [(g(x)w2+wivi)/x)] or average
variable cost [g(x)w2/2] in the first order condition (FOC) of profit maximization,
so that the FOC's are: Px'(P)+ x(P) - ((g(x)w2+wlVi)/x)x'(P)=0 ==> If full cost is
used. Px'(P)+  x(P) -  (g(x)w2/2)xl(P)   =  0  ==>   If variable cost is used.
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decision under complete information (where marginal cost equal to marginal
revenue) is Q* and P*. The use of absorption costing result in quantity and price
Qa and Pa, which are closer to the optimal quantity and Price Q* and P* than that
of the use of variable costing that results in Qv and Pv. The more elastic demand
curve D' results in the greater deviation between the Qa and Pa Qv and Pv with Q*
Figure 1 : Accounting product cost as surrogates for marginal cost.
On the contrary, when the cost is decreasing, the condition that happens
when the output level is less than that of minimum total average cost, the average
total cost per unit is greater than the marginal cost. In this condition, the fixed cost
per unit added to average variable cost make the quantity and price decided based
on full cost deviates greater to optimal condition than that of average variable
cost. Thus, the variable cost per unit is a better proxy to the marginal cost when
the cost is decreasing, and a less elastii demand will result in a better
approximation.
Based on those analysis Dickout and Lere (1983) and Lere (1986) predicts
that decision makers under incomplete information can approach the economic
optimal condition by using the accounting product costs and certain heuristic and
simple-calculations.
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PRICE AND OUTPUT LEVEL DECISION UNDER OLIGOPOLY
The analysis of pricing decision between monopolistic and oligopolistic
firm is very different in that while in monopoly the pricing decision analysis
corresponds to output level decision, in oligopoly the provided models separate
between that focus on price (Bertrand's model) and that focus on quantity
(Cournot's model).
Dorward (1986), based on the Cournot's model, theoretically explains that
full cost (proportional) pricing will be the most profitable pricing strategy under
collusive (non-collusive) oligopolistic situation. Since Cournot's model is not
always the best predictor of the competition and is criticized for its naivety
(Friedman, 1983), this paper will analyze the pricing strategy in non-cooperative
oligopoly using the other model i.e. Bertrand's model.
Nash   equilibrium   pricing   strategies developed based on individuals
utility function by Choi et al. (1990) will be used here to identify the firms' pricing
strategy in competition. For analyzing price competition, one dimensional
duopoly market will be used to derive the comparative static. Profit function of
the firms are analyzed based on the derived demand based on the consumer
preference model using multidimensional scaling (MDS). It is assumed that each
firm produces a single brand with constant marginal cost (so that marginal cost
equal to average cost), and there is a finite maximum quality q that a product can
achieve. Let the pj and qj denote the price and quality of brand j respectively, a
vector (pj,q,) defines brand j. For Uj denote a consumer's utility derived from the
purchased of brand j:
where w is a scaling parameter for price which is positive, andV(qi) is a value of a
product with quality j such that,
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Where RP is reservation price, v is the weight for the quality dimension, and I q-q,
| k is appropriate distance metric (with k=2 for MDS). For specification of the
demand function which based on the individual demand level, the disaggregate
choice models are used to incorporate individual heterogeneity, and logit model is
used. Let Pr, denotes the probability that a consumer will choose brand j:
pr =
Where  is a parameter inversely related to ε, and will be estimated by using the
predetermined utility function. The total demand of a brand is a sum of individual
consumer probabilities; so the profit of firm jth is:
for j, k = 1,2 and j  k, Q is the market size C (q1) is unit cost to produce a brand
of quality level qj, and Cj (qj) os assumed to be a nondecreasing function.
Based on the profit function (1,4), Nash equilibrium of the price
competition can be developed as that pne = (p1ne, p2ne) is a Nash equibibrium
(NPE) if,
In Nash equilibrium no one firm can benefit by changing its strategy. In the
situation with fixed quality, NPE is a price vector (pr, p:*) which simultaneously
maximizes n, and defined in equation 1.4.
Equation (1.3) indicates that every consumer should chose one brand
regardless of the price, because there is no price elasticity in the function. To get
more meaningful analysis, it is important to incorporate price elasticity of demand
in the total demand defined in equation (1.3) by including "no purchase" option in
the equation, so that:
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After including purchase option, the equation means that the firms can not
charge too high price. But from equation 1.4, the first order condition can be
derived for profit maximization:
As from (1.1) and (1.6), and pseudoconcavity of TC^ , 8prj/5p1 < 0 because w >0.
Also, Pn > 0 because of the property of logit function, so the RHS of (1.7) is
positive, and p, > C,, that means that the firm can't do no worse than zero profit,
and the prices are naturally bounded below by marginal cost.
When , is pseudoconcave with respect to PJ for j=l,23; then under the
logit model (1.6), a NPE exist only in the interval Q(<lj) < Pi < f°r both firm j =
1,2s. A sufficient condition for the existence of Nash equilibrium is then:
For pj : consider the limiting profits as the price goes to infinity;
3
 Proofs :
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Applying L ‘Hospital’s rule results in :
(1.1.2) is zero because Pr, is zero, implies zero profit at the infinite prices, and the
equilibrium prices are bounded from above. where pj is some reasonable upper
bound of pj4. This means that a Nash equilibrium is more likely to exist as
consumers are less sensitive to price changes (smaller w) and their choices are
more probabilistic (less fl) . If the consumers are highly price sensitive so that the
effect of price difference exceeds that of brand differences, firms will keep
undercutting the other's price for a larger share. The undercutting process induces
discontinuity in the demand functions, and (as a result of Bertrand's competition),
makes the higher cost producers go out of business and the lowest cost producer
becomes monopolist.
Since the RHS of (1.1,3) is always positive when prj > = ½ the condition is always
satisfied. When prj < ½ since (1-2prj) <= 1, the following  condition guarantees
(1.1.3) holds :
4 This reflects the existence of NEP for the model through a concavity condition. The proof is as
follows:
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Nash equilibrium under condition (1.8) is the solution of the following
system :
Since Q is positive constant and Prj > 0, and j = 1,2 (a property of discrete choice
functions including the logit model with finite prices), equation (1.9) can be
reduced as:
The equation (1-10) is very complicated problem to solve due to logit function.
However, some limited comparative static can be derived using parametric
analysis. Because the two equations are symmetry, only one equation that
represent one firm will be analyzed. Let © represents the parameters V., C,, H,
and w, and fi and f2 is the two functions of (1.10);
The total differentiation of (1.11) result in :
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Equations (1.12) is solved for p1 / and p2 /, result in :
Based on the solution of (1.13), the effects of various parameters on the
equilibrium price related with cost can be identified, with C'j denotes the first
derivative of the cost function of brand j with respect to Vj, as follows:
If Cj >= 0, or higher cost results in higher quality, equation (1.15) is
positive, so that the higher cost results in higher quality and price; but equation
(1.15) is indeterminant. The change in brand-2's price depends on firm-l's cost and
price sensitivity of the consumers. If pi increases significantly, p2 will also
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increase. But if pi I increases slightly with increase in quality, the firm-2 decreases
p2 to regain the lost market share. Both equation (1.16) and (1.17) have positive
sign, but the latter is an additive term to the former. This means that I a cost
reduction by a firm results in its price reduction, and this also forces the other
competing firm's price to decrease. Consequently the profit of firm 2 decreases as
the product cost of firm 1 decreases, as represented by the positive sign of
where the second term vanishes in equilibrium, and the first term is positive.
However, the effect of cost reduction to its own profit is less obvious because of
the opposite effects of the reduced cost and price levels.
From the discussion above, the use of ac-counting product costs can be
predicted. In non-cooperative oligopolistic situation and the price sensitivity of the
consumers is high, variable cost is a better basis for the decision makers to
determine the price, because the firms in the industry compete by undercutting
their price. As indicated in equation (1.7) the price is bounded by marginal cost, or
average variable cost in case the marginal cost information is not available.
The use of full cost in this situation may result in the price is too high and
the firm loses its market share. In the situation when the price sensitivity is low
the full cost is a better basis for price decision for the firms to gain the profit,
since the slightly increase in price with higher quality product will at least
maintain the market share. These prediction is similar with those of Dorward
(1986) that under non-collusive (collusive) oligopoly and Cournot's equilibrium
proportional  (full) cost based pricing is more efficient.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION
The analysis of the use of accounting product costs by oligopolistic firms
under Bertrand's equilibrium reveal similar result with that of Cournot's
equilibrium, however the Bertrands model provide more information than
Cournot's model in that Bertrand's model indicates that doing in oligopolistic
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market has more complex problems than that of monopolistic firms. While
monopolistic firms consider only their own cost functions and demand functions,
the oligopolistic firms should consider the actions and reactions of the competitors
in addition to the consumers' utility preference and the firms' cost functions. This
complexity indicates more comprehensive heuristic process in pricing and
quantity decision than that of illustrated by Dickhout and Lere (1983) and Lore
(1986).
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